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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
disturbance. In reversing the conviction, the Court reiterated that "'an
undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance . . . is not enough
to overcome the right to freedom of expression.' "-39
What then distinguishes "fighting words" from ordinary words?
Fighting words "inflict injury" and "tend to create a breach of the
peace." Clearly, the Court in Chaplinsky had reference to terms so
strongly abusive as to be analogous to a physical assault. In Cohen no
epithets were employed, and the message was not directed at any particu-
lar individual. Thus the message lacked the highly personal nature which
characterized the insult in Chaplinsky. The highly personal nature of the
insult, the degree of abusiveness in the insult, and the immediacy of the
probable retaliation distinguish fighting words from other words. It is
impossible to list the words which might constitute fighting words when
hurled as an insult; they vary with the times and with the local customs
of people. In the 1940's "Fascist" was a highly abusive term, and in the
1950's and 1960's "Communist" was often used in name-calling. The
determinative factor is the manner in which the words are used. When
highly abusive words a're used in a manner so provocative as to virtually
assure retaliation, the "fighting words" doctrine operates to exclude
such expression from first amendment protection. As Cox, Street, and
Cohen indicate, the societal interest in order must clearly outweigh the
individual interest in expression to justify application of the narrow
doctrine of "fighting words."
JOSEPH E. WALL
Constitutional Law-Torts -Defamation and the First Amendment: The
Elements and Application of the Reckless-Disregard Test
On June 7, 1971, the United States Supreme Court handed down
its latest decision concerning the conflicting interests of state libel law
and the first amendment. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia1 was a libel action
brought by a distributor of a nudist magazine against a radio station
for broadcasting defamatory news bulletins concerning his arrest for
11403 U.S. at 23, quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 508 (1969).
1403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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selling obscene literature and his lawsuit against the city and police
officials and several local news media. The eight justices who considered
the case filed five separate opinions. A brief consideration of two cases
leading up to this decision will help determine why the Court was so
bitterly divided.
In 1964 the Supreme Court held in New York Times v. Sullivan
2
that the first amendment precludes recovery by a public official for a
defamatory falsehood concerning his official conduct in the absence of
a showing that the falsehood was made with knowledge of its falsity or
with reckless disregard of whether or not it was false. Finding the case
to be a proper one for review of the evidence, 3 the Court held that there
was insufficient evidence to support a finding of intentional or reckless
falsehood and remanded.
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,' a 1967 case, the Court consid-
ered the effect of the first amendment upon the right to recover for
defamation of one who, although not a public official, is before the
public eye by voluntary conduct. Mr. Justice Harlan for the plurality
opined that "public figures" can recover upon a showing of highly
unreasonable conduct,- on which point he felt the evidence sufficient.
Chief Justice Warren, whose separate opinion was the lowest common
denominator and thus the holding of the Court,6 thought a finding of
intentional or reckless falsehood to be required for public figures as well
as public officials. However, he agreed that the evidence was sufficient
to support such a finding,
Rosenbloom could have been decided on the ground that plaintiff
was a public figure required under Butts to prove intentional or reckless
falsehood. George Rosenbloom had, after all, voluntarily undertaken to
become a distributor of nudist magazines. No doubt he recognized the
controversial nature of the magazines. The defendant radio station in-
deed argued that by so doing the plaintiff had assumed the risk of public
exposure and furthermore that his arrest and institution of a novel law-
2376 U.S. 254 (1964).
'For a discussion of appellate review of constitutional fact see Strong, The Persistent Doctrine
of"Constitutional Fact," 46 N.C.L. REv. 223 (1968).
'388 U.S. 130 (1967).
5By "highly unreasonable conduct" Justice Harlan apparently meant gross negligence.
6388 U.S. at 162. Three justices held that reckless disregard is required for public figures.
Justices Black and Douglas held that there can be no recovery for even intentional falsehoods.
Therefore, at least five justices would not allow recovery without a showing of reckless disregard.
1972]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
suit added to his status as a public figure. 7 However, the Court assumed
without discussion that the plaintiff was not a public figure and thus
reached the issue of the effect of the first amendment on libel actions
brought by private individuals. Mr. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion
stated that a private citizen cannot recover for a defamatory falsehood
concerning a matter of legitimate public interest in the absence of a
showing of intentional or reckless falsehood. Mr. Justice White con-
curred in the result but limited his opinion to cases involving the conduct
of public officials, such as the action by police in arresting Mr. Rosen-
bloom.8 Add Mr. Justice Black's absolutist opinion-that the first
amendment bars recovery even for intentional falsehoods'-and the
White opinion as lowest common denomenator becomes the holding of
the Court. 0 Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Marshall" opined that a pri-
vate plaintiff can recover for libel upon a showing of ordinary negli-
gence, whether or not a matter of legitimate public interest is involved.
Mr. Justice Brennan took the position that the basis for the New
York Times rule was protection of first amendment interests, which
include not only self-governance but also all matters of legitimate public
concern. "If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot
suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved,
or because in some sense the individual did not 'voluntarily' choose to
become involved."' 2 Thus, if New York Times is right, the argument
continues, so is the position taken by the plurality. Justice Brennan
further held that the reckless-disregard standard is required because self-
censorship induced by the threat of a libel judgment offends the first
amendment, and any standard of protection less than reckless disregard
will result in self-censorship.1 3 He concluded that there is a constitutional
privilege to report on matters of general or public interest, and that the
7Brief for Respondent at 18 n.5.
8403 U.S. at 57.
vd. at 57.
lrrhe White opinion is the lowest common denominator in that at least five justices extend
this much protection to defendants. With respect to plaintiffs, the Brennan plurality opinion repre-
sents the minimum protection that at least five justices are willing to extend.
"Mr. Justice Harlan dissented in a separate opinion. Id. at 62. Mr. Justice Marshall authored
a dissent in which Mr. Justice Stewart concurred. Id. at 78.
12 d. at 43.
"3Whether self-censorship or exercise of ordinary care is what would result if the negligence
standard urged by Justice Harlan were adopted is, of course, unknown. One might feel that there
is a substantial risk of self-censorship and that it is better to err in favor of free debate.
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privilege may be defeated only by a showing that the publisher acted with
reckless disregard of the truth, evidence thereof being reviewable on
appeal.
Justices Harlan and Marshall, contrary to Mr. Justice Brennan,
held that New York Times was based in part upon our history of sedi-
tious libel and upon the proposition that when public officials are in-
volved the state interest does not fully apply. In support of this latter
proposition, Harlan argued that a public official has access to the media
to correct false statements and that he assumes the risk of defamatory
publications.' Thus, while public officials must prove reckless disregard
to recover for libel, public figures (who also have access to the media
and assume the risk) need only provegross negligence because as to them
there is no seditious libel consideration. As to private plaintiffs, the state
interest fully applies, and ordinary negligence is adequate protection of
the constitutional interests involved. Justices Harlan and Marshall both
expressed concern that the plurality's ill-defined reckless-disregard stan-
dard and insistance upon appellate review of evidence would result in
"ad hoc balancing" of the federal and state interests; 5 they forecast as
consequences a lack of predictability and undue involvement of the
Court in the fact-finding process. Justice Harlan's concern therefore was
to discern "generally applicable rules that should balance with fair preci-
sion the competing interests at stake."' 8 Justices Marshall and Harlan
were also offended by the necessity under the plurality view for a judicial
determination of what constitutes a matter of legitimate public interest,
a determination which they felt to be beyond judicial competency.
Assuming that the plurality view does become law, a plaintiff in-
volved in a public event may nevertheless recover for libel if: (1) the
defaming statement is false, and (2) it is knowingly or recklessly uttered.
The first element, falsity, is traditionally presumed. 7 There is dictum in
another Supreme Court case, Rosenblatt v. Baer,'" however, to support
"For a discussion questioning the validity of the access-to-the-media argument, see Kalven,
The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 267.
As for assumed risk, this is but a legal conclusion that a public figure cannot recover for non-
reckless libel, and can in no wise be considered a reason for withholding recovery.
"SFor a discussion of "ad hoc" and "definitional balancing" with respect to the first amend-
ment, see Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger": From Schenck to Branden-
burg-and Beyond, 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 41, 58-80.
16403 U.S. at 63 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
'7Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 273 A.2d 899 (1971).
19383 U.S. 75, 84 (1966).
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the contention that New York Times has shifted the burden to the
plaintiff to prove falsity. At least two federal cases have placed the
burden on the plaintiff without discussion.' 9 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, on the other hand, recently held that the burden is still on the
defendant .2 The language in Rosenblatt was read to mean that if the
defendant offers proof of truth, then the plaintiff must overcome that
proof. The court reasoned that the presumption of innocence applies to
the plaintiff in an action for defamation, thus raising a presumption that
a defamatory statement is false, and that placing the burden on the
plaintiff would put him in the difficult position of having to prove a
negative.
The second essential element required to defeat the defendant's con-
stitutional privilege is that the statement be made with knowledge that
it is false or reckless disregard as to whether the statement is false. If
falsity is presumed, what happens when it is shown that prior to publica-
tion the defendant was in a position to know whether his statements were
true or false? For example, if the plaintiff shows that the defendant's
correspondent was present when he allegedly led a crowd of people
against national guardsmen in order to block integration,2" would a
presumption of falsity create a presumption of intentional falsity?2 Ap-
parently the answer of the Pennsylvania court is "yes." Thus when the
defendant had enough personal knowledge of the plaintiff to know
whether his statements about her were true or false, and when falsity was
presumed without proof, the defendant was found to have acted with
knowledge of falsity.2 Such a result clearly seems contrary to New York
Times: "Such a presumption is inconsistent with the federal rule."12
When the plaintiff shows that the defendant knew a statement was
false, there is no constitutional problem since the first amendment does
not protect intentional falsehoods.25 However, the defendant's knowl-
edge of falsity must exist with respect to the false impression created in
the mind of his audience. If he knows that the plaintiff is being sued in
civil court, but his publication creates the impression that the plaintiff
"Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969); Sellers v. Time Inc., 299 F. Supp. 582
(E.D. Pa. 1969).
2'Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 273 A.2d 899 (1971).
2'Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
12Similarly, presumed falsity would be projected into presumed reckless-disregard.
2Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 273 A.2d 899 (1971).
2376 U.S. at 283-84.
?'Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
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is subject to criminal charges, his falsehood is intentional only if he
knows that he is creating this false impression.26 Also, knowledge must
exist at the time of publication, and failure to retract after notice of
falsity will not suffice.27 Finally, the kind of knowledge required is actual
and subjective; the mere fact that there is information in the defendant's
files which is contrary to his publication does not constitute such knowl-
edge. 
28
When knowing falsehood is not shown, and the plaintiff relies on
reckless disregard, the problem of balancing state and federal interests
arises. While the Supreme Court has formulated no comprehensive test
of reckless disregard, it has provided some meaningful guidelines. It
must be found that the defendant "in fact entertained serious doubts as
to the truth of his publication," 29 that is, that he acted with a "high
degree of awareness" of probable falsity.3 However, in Curtis Publish-
ing Co. v. Butts 31 a nationally famous college football coach was falsely
charged with having fixed a football game, and the finding of the requis-
ite degree of awareness was based upon the following criteria: (1) defen-
dant knew that the informant relied upon was on probation in connec-
tion with check violations, (2) only a football expert could competently
have inferred from the notes taken by the informant upon overhearing
the conversation alleged to be a fix that the game was in fact fixed, and
(3) Wally Butts and his daughter protested to the defendant prior to
publication that the charges were false. The Court emphasized that the
defendant had embarked upon a policy of "sophisticated muckraking"
to increase circulation and was not reporting "hot news. '32 If Butts can
be reconciled with the "high degree of awareness" requirement, it can
be only by consideration of the two major interests involved, the factors
which affect each, and the manner in which they are balanced under the
reckless-disregard standard.
The state's interest is in "compensating individuals for actual, mea-
surable harm caused by the [wrongful] conduct of others"3 3 and in deter-
ring future wrongful conduct. The greater the harm, the greater the
"Tilton v. Cowles Publishing Co., 76 Wash. 2d 707,459 P.2d 8 (1969).
"New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 286-87 (1964).
23ld. at 287.
2St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
"Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,74 (1964).
3'388 U.S. 130 (1967).
M2d. at 157-58.
P403 U.S. at 66 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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state's interest. In the area of libel, the amount of harm done is generally
proportional to the severity of the charges made. The constitutional
interest is in promoting "a citizenry informed by a free and unfettered
press ' 34 with special sensitivity to seditious libel. The three factors which
most strongly affect this interest are the proximity to seditious libel, the
public need to be informed. about a matter, and the possibility of self-
censorship resulting from the threat of liability. The reckless-disregard
standard should be expected to deal with each of these factors in one way
or another.
Since reckless disregard is a subjective standard3 5 the relevant in-
quiry is what evidence is required to show it, evidence being reviewable
on appeal. The plaintiff Will generally try to show that facts were known
to the defendant which would cause an average man to perceive that
there was a substantial risk of falsity. From this the jury may infer that
defendant did in fact so perceive. The greater the risk of falsity actually
appreciated by the defendant, and the more severe the charges, the more
likely a finding of reckless disregard. Also, as' the appreciated risk3"
increases, the minimum required level of severity decreases until at the
point where the appreciated risk approaches one hundred percent-that
is, when the defendant has actual knowledge of falsity-the charges need
only be severe enough to create some state interest in compensation or
deterrence. Conversely, as the severity of the charges increases, the re-
quisite appreciated risk decreases.3 7 Thus in Butts, notwithstanding that
Uld. at 78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
25St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,730-31 (1968).
6The appreciated risk is the actual risk to the extent that it is perceived by the defendant. The
actual risk, on the other hand, is the probability of falsity given the facts known or readily knowable
to the defendant. When the risk of falsity is 85% but the evidence does not warrant an inference
that this risk was fully perceived by the defendant, then the appreciated risk is somewhat less than
85% (perhaps 65%, for example). But a 25% risk fully perceived constitutes a 25% appreciated risk.
nThe approximate relationship between appreciated risk and severity (which might range from
zero to one, for example) can be expressed symbolically:
(appreciated risk) (severity of the charges + K ! ) is greater than K I
The constant K1 has a magnitude determined by our concept of how much fault is required to
constitute recklessness. When the inequality holds, defendant is reckless (as distinguished from
reckless disregard which, as will be shown, is cognizant of other variables.) The above expression
was used rather than the simpler formulation
(appreciated risk) (severity) is greater than K1
because it was necessary to show that when appreciated risk approaches 100%, the severity need
only be large enough to create some state interest but need not be of the magnitude of K I . In
other words, the product of appreciated risk and severity simply expresses the amount of harm likely
to occur through falsity, which need not be large when we are dealing with intentional falsehood.
[Vol. 50
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the evidence does not seem to support a finding of "a high degree of
awareness of probable falsity"--that is, of high appreciated risk-the
defendant was said to be reckless3 owing to the fact that the charges
were severe. Thus the Court was arguably correct in finding that the
defendant acted with reckless disregard, unless factors which represent
the constitutional interest were present in such a magnitude as to make
the defendant's conduct justifiable in some sense.
Whether a defendant's conduct can be said to be justifiable9 will
necessarily depend upon two factors: the magnitude of the constitutional
interest in his communication,'" and the burden of verifying his informa-
tion. Even if there is a very strong public interest in given subject mat-
ter,"4 if the defendant's information might easily and quickly be verified,
then his reckless conduct can hardly be said to be justifiable-. On the
other hand, when verification would be difficult and expensive, requiring
it would have the general effect of depriving the public of communica-
tion. When the public need for the information is great, then even con-
duct of a marginally reckless magnitude may be protected as justifiable;
hence reckless disregard is said not to exist. Even when the public interest
and burden are great, however, conduct that is of an extremely reckless
nature will not be protected. As previously noted, 2 there is some doubt
as to the competency of courts to determine the public interest in given
subject matter. Apparently, however, the courts do weigh public interest,
38For the purposes of this note, "recklessness" and "reckless disregard" are treated as techni-
cal terms having different meanings. "Recklessness" considers only appreciated risk and severity,
while "reckless disregard" considers these factors plus public or constitutional interest and
burden of verification.
39"Justifiability" as used in this note is analogous to but distinct from justification concepts
in negligence. In negligence, a risk created by the defendant may be justified by the social utility of
his conduct if the only alternative to the risk would impose a prohibitive burden on the conduct
and hence deprive the public of a valuable social utility. In such a case the defendant is not at fault.
Justifiability is analogous in that when the public interest in defendant's publication is great, and
the burden of verification is prohibitive, the defendant's conduct may be justifiable (resulting in no
-liability) notwithstanding the fact that he has acted recklessly. Justifiability is distinct from justifi-
cation in that with respect to justifiability the defendant is still at fault.
"0Where seditious libel considerations are present, the constitutional interest in protecting the
defendant's communication is greatest for two reasons. Firstly, the public interest in effective self-
governance is present. Secondly, there may be an additional constitutional interest involved because
of the special sensitivty to seditious libel. And this latter, if present, would not be mitigated by the
lack of a substantial burden of verification.
"Of course there is no public interest in the dissemination of false statements. When the public
interest in a defendant's communication is referred to herein, what is meant is the public interest
in dissemination of the statements assuming them to be true.
"See text following note 16 supra.
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covertly or overtly, though they tend to be less influenced by it than the
other factors already discussed.
43
Thus in Butts, the Court emphasized that the Saturday Evening
Post had embarked upon a policy of "sophisticated muckraking."'" The
Minnesota Supreme Court read this portion of Butts to mean that defen-
dant's publication was serving its own commercial interests (to bolster
circulation) rather than the public interest.45 The Minnesota court also
concluded that while Butts extended the reckless-disregard standard to
public figures, less evidence is required to establish reckless disregard in
an action by a public figure than in an action by a public official.46
Presumably this is because the constitutional interest is greater when an
action is brought by a public official because of the proximity to sedi-
tious libel. The Court in Butts also emphasized that the defendant's
arhe burden of verification may have a value anywhere from zero (no burden) to infinity
(verification impossible). When verification is impossible, the public interest fully applies. When
there is no burden (verification might be accomplished quickly and easily), then the public interest
does not apply at all because imposition of the burden will not tend to deprive the public of
communication. Thus, as the burden increases from zero to infinity, the facor by which the public




Since public interest is a means of finding reckless conduct justifiable by increasing the magnitude
of recklessness required to establish reckless disregard, it should be added to K I on the right-hand
side of the inequality set out in note 37 supra: '
(appreciated risk) (severity + K) K (public interest) 
(burden)
I K 3 X(burden + K 2)1
Public interest is divided by K3 , a constant greater than one, to indicate that courts, feeling
incompetent to determine the weight to accord the public interest in a given communication, will
not consider public interest to the extent they consider other factors.
Since proximity to seditious libel is a constitutional interest not affected by burden of verifici-
cation, a variable denoting the value of this interest should be added to the right-hand side of the
inequality:
.(public interest) (burden) "
(appreciated risk) (severity + K' (pb 3 i (burden) + (seditious libel)
(b X urden + A' 2
388 U.S. at 158.
4Rose v. Koch, 278 Minn. 235, 239, 154 N.W.2d 409,413 (1967).
61d. at 262; 154 N.W.2d at 427-28.
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publication was not "hot news."4 The defendant in Rosenbloom con-
tended in his brief that the relevance of "hot news" is that requiring
verification of each item would deprive the public of the valuable service
provided by publishing news as it happens. 8 Finally, the Court in Butts
noted that elementary and easily taken precautions were open to the
defendant but were ignored.49 All this implies that there was no over-
whelming constitutional or public interest which the defendant was serv-
ing, and even if there was, it was not fully applicable because the burden
of verification was only slight.
Analysis to determine whether the first amendment bars a recovery
for libel should determine first whether a matter of public interest (or a
public official or figure) was involved and, if so, whether the statement
was false (this may depend on who has the burden of proof).5" If both
of these inquires are answered affirmatively, it should then be determined
whether the falsehood was intentional. If so, the first amendment privi-
lege is defeated; if not, it must finally be determined whether defendant
acted recklessly and, if so, whether his conduct was justifiable. If
unjustifiable recklessness does appear, the first amendment will not bar
recovery.
Certain general conclusions can be drawn from a reading of the
cases on reckless disregard-that is, unjustifiable recklessness-and ex-
plained in terms of the variables discussed above. Whether or not the
public interest in the defendant's communication is great. he cannot be
considered reckless in relying on a third party in the absence of obvious
reasons to doubt that person's veracity. He may rely on a news service, 5'
or individuals known to have good character, 52 or one whose veracity is
unknown,53 or even on a single source representing only one side of a
controversy.54 In all such cases, it cannot be said that the defendant is
taking a meaningful appreciated risk.
On the other hand, where there are obvious reasons for disbelieving
statementsof a third party, then a substantial appreciated risk arises and
11388 U.S. at 157.
"8Brief for Respondent at 31-32.
11388 U.S. at 157.
5OSee text at note 19 supra.
"Walker v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 246 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Ky. 1965).
"2New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
OSt. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
mNew York Times v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966).
1972]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the defendant may be found to have been reckless, and justifiability
again will depend on the magnitude of the constitutional interests. Thus
when the defendant relies on a layman of doubtful veracity to draw
inferences of serious misconduct and when it is obvious that those infer-
ences may be competently drawn only by an expert, he has been held
reckless 5s Nor may the defendant rely on an anonymous phone call,"0
since one who will not disclose his identity is inherently unreliable. Nor
may he rely on one of good reputation known to be relating hearsay
from an unreliable source, when the charges made are improbable and
severe. 57 Finally, when the defendant relies solely upon statements made
by a prison inmate who with obvious reason to lie (his own freedom)
makes severe charges (murder, witness tampering, malicious prosecu-
tion), he may be considered reckless. And even when strong constitu-
tional interests exist (self-governance, seditious libel) and means of veri-
fication do not, if the defendant also knows that the informant's state-
ments are completely inconsistent with known material facts, the con-
duct is too reckless to be justifiable."
If the defendant bases an inference on facts known or believed to
be true, he will be protected unless the severity and improbability of that
inference are of reckless magnitude. 59 Thus the defendant is not reckless
in drawing a conclusion of improper conduct from the fact that qounty
paving equipment was seen in use in paving a county official's driveway,
and he will not be liable even though he might easily have learned
whether the plaintiff official had paid for the service. 0 The defendant
may infer from a thorough knowledge of the plaintiff's political philoso-
phy that the plaintiff is a fascist; from the fact that plaintiffs newspaper
printed articles which the defendant believes increased the risk of race
riots that the plaintiff is a race riot promoter; and from the fact that a
OCurtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
1St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968) (dictum).
7Mahnke v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 280 Minn. 328, 160 N.W.2d 1 (1968).
mlndianapolis Newspapers, Inc. v. Fields, -nd _259 N.E.2d 651 (1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 930 (1970).
5 Since the manner in which people draw inferences is not always logical, especially if the one
inferring is not sophisticated or is influenced by emotion or prejudice, it must appear not only that
the inference is illogical but also that the defendant probably did not believe it himself before a
meaningful appreciated risk arises on which a finding of reckless disregard can be predicated.
Furthermore, there is generally a privilege under state law to express opinion, at least when the
factual basis for the opinion also appears. Cherry v. Des Moines Leader, 114 Iowa 298, 86 N.W.
323 (1901).
"Tagawa v. Maui Publishing Co., 448 P.2d 337 (Hawaii 1968).
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cartoon in plaintiffs newspaper depicted a judge and made reference to
his Jewish ancestory that the plaintiff is a Jew-baiter." Even when the
drawing of the defendant's inference borders on recklessness, when he
concludes from a tenuous past relationship that the plaintiff is a col-
league of two United States fugitives, if the public interest is great
(organized crime), and the burden of verification is difficult, if not pro-
hibitive, the defendant will not be held to have acted with unjustifiable
recklessness 62
However, if the facts tend to negate rather than support an infer-
ence, as when defendant concludes that a murder-suicide was the act of
the "happiest mother in town," the inference can be said to be a fabrica-
tion which the defendant must have strongly suspected, if not known,
to be untrue.63 And when the defendant's lay opinion is obviously incapa-
ble of accurately inferring serious misconduct from a few facts believed
to be true and expert opinion is available, the defendant's drawing of
those inferences over the plaintiff's protest of falsity will not receive first
amendment protection, at least in the absence of strong constitutional
interests. 4
Two lawsuits resulting from the same set of facts and the same
publication yielded one United States district court 65 and two circuit
court of appeals66 opinions which are seemingly unreconcilable with the
formulation discussed above. The defendant had put together an article
concerning the arrest of several "Cosa Nostra big wigs." The article
pictured a group of these men at a dinner with two lawyers, Ragano and
Wasserman, who had been hired to defend them. Originally the two
attorneys were referred to as "mouthpieces," but this reference was
deleted or lost in the editing process. The result was that a reader of the
article would have the impression that defendant's reference to the pic-
tured group as "hoodlums" included the two attorneys. Ragano
brought suit in the Federal District Court for the Middle District of
Florida.6" the trial judge denied the defendant's motion for summary
6trait v. King Broadcasting Co., I Wash. App. 250, 460 P.2d 307 (1969). A possible factor in
this case is that the plaintiff as a newspaper editor clearly had access to the media.
"rTime, Inc. v. MeLaney, 406 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1969).
"Varnish v. Best Medium Publishing Co., 405 F.2d 609, 610 n.I (2d Cir. 1968).
"Curis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
"Ragano v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1005 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
"Time, Inc. v. Ragano, 427 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1970); Wasserman v. Time, Inc., 424 F.2d 920
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
67Ragano v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1005 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
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judgment but permitted an interlocutory appeal. The Fifth Circuit af-
firmed. 8 Both the district and the court of appeals held that there was a
genuine issue of fact as to reckless disregard. The D.C. Circuit was in
accord and reversed the district court's entry of summary judgment in
an action by the other attorney, Wasserman.69 The basis for the holding
was that defendant knew plaintiffs to be lawyers but nevertheless referred
to them as "hoodlums." The plaintiffs appear to have little chance of
showing that the article was defamatory as a result of anything more
than bureaucratic negligence in editing. Perhaps the denial of summary
judgment indicated nothing more than that plaintiffs should be given the
chance to prove at trial that defendant's reporters realized the defama-
tory nature of its article. On the other hand, in light of the reviewability
of constitutional fact as recognized by Judge Skelly Wright. concurring
in Wasserman,70 this seems unlikely. Two other possible justifications
present very interesting problems in this area of the law.
One justification for Ragano and Wasserman is implicit in the
statement of District Judge Krentzman:
[flailure to delineate fact from opinion in such characterizations would
have a deterrent effect upon the availability of attorneys to represent
persons accused of crime and could foreseeably result in frustrating the
constitutional rights of an accused to secure services of counsel of his
choice."
Hence, there is a conflict between the first amendment and the sixth
amendment. If this is indeed the explanation of Ragano, then the impli-
cations are highly significant. The courts have not dealt so far with the
conflict between fair trial and the New York Times doctrine, but it is a
problem they will almost certainly have to face.
The second possible explanation for Ragano is that there is going
to be some erosion of the reckless-disregard standard in certain instances
in order to shift the "cost of doing business" to the news industry. Such
an inroad on New York Times would almost certainly be concerned
primarily with situations in which the harm results from faults in the
operaton of bureaucracies rather than expressions of points of view. The
6rTime, Inc. v. Ragano, 427 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1970).
69Wasserman v. Time, Inc., 424 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
'
0 Id. at 922-23.
71Ragano v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1005, 1009 (M.D. Fla. 1969) (emphasis added).
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extent and limits of such a doctrine can only be matters of speculation
at this time.
The reckless-disregard standard is very complex and may be diffi-
cult to apply.72 If the Supreme-Court decides many of these cases, the
complexity of the application of the standard combined with the necess-
ity for constitutional fact-finding may prove to be an unhappy burden
on an already greatly overworked Court. Some commentators have sug-
gested that the quality of the Court's work has already begun to suffer.73
In light of these considerations, perhaps Mr. Justice Harlan's desire to
formulate simple rules which can be easily and quickly applied without
pulling the Court so far into the fact-finding process can be appreciated.
KENNETH S. CANNADAY
Military Law-Retroactivity of the Service-Connection Test of the Juris-
diction of Courts-Martial
Throughout the history of the United States, the relationship of the
nation's military establishment to the civilian'government has been a
recurring problem. One facet of this relationship that has resulted in
significant tension concerns the proper division of jurisdiction between
the military and civilian courts. The determination of when a particular
defendant is subject to military jurisdiction is difficult because of the
inherent stress between constitutional guarantees in the application of
military justice.' Several constitutional provisions 2 and a myriad of fed-
eral statutes3 deal with the military's jurisdiction over its members. The
problem is complicated because these provisions are not always consist-
ent.4
The difference between the civilian and military systems of justice
lies in the denial to military personnel of some of the protections of the
"See note 43 supra.
"See Strong, The Time Has Come To Talk of a Major Curtailment in the Supreme Cori's
Jurisdiction, 48 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1969), and commentators cited therein.
'Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355, 362 (1971).
'See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
'The Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
UCMJ], sets out the general scheme of military justice.
'For example, until 1957 precisely how the Bill of Rights applies to servicemen was uncertain.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 (1957).
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